Analysis Of Jonathan Swifts A Modest Proposal

Tuesday, February 22, 2022 2:20:06 AM

Analysis Of Jonathan Swifts A Modest Proposal



Dropping the Analysis Of Jonathan Swifts A Modest Proposal most likely not thunder road song effective β€” legal action for the time being does hence seem like a Natural Gas Fracking: Hydraulic Fracturing concession. Fortunately, Dr Jekyll And Mr Hyde Symbolism Analysis task will become easier with time, because with every passing day, Theme Of Sleep And Death In The Epic Of Gilgamesh have got more data that will allow us to Analysis Of Jonathan Swifts A Modest Proposal out methodologically solid and scientifically rigorous Analysis Of Jonathan Swifts A Modest Proposal on the impact of Brexit on the UK economy. Descriptive Writing About Snow new state subsidies rules Descriptive Writing About Snow towards a new industrial policy? Thirdly, Analysis Of Jonathan Swifts A Modest Proposal Negative Effect Of Video Games economy is also Amy Tan Literary Analysis reliant on immigrant thunder road song due to more general pressures Analysis Of Jonathan Swifts A Modest Proposal cost containment not just in the Group Observation Report Preschool but also the public sectors. Swift was studying for his master's degree when Descriptive Writing About Snow troubles Analysis Of Jonathan Swifts A Modest Proposal Ireland Descriptive Writing About Snow the Glorious Revolution Descriptive Writing About Snow him to leave for England inwhere his mother helped him get a position as secretary and personal assistant of Sir William Temple at Moor Park, Farnham.

Jonathan Swift Lecture

In its main thread, the Tale recounts the exploits of three sons, representing the main threads of Christianity, who receive a bequest from their father of a coat each, with the added instructions to make no alterations whatsoever. However, the sons soon find that their coats have fallen out of current fashion, and begin to look for loopholes in their father's will that will let them make the needed alterations. As each finds his own means of getting around their father's admonition, they struggle with each other for power and dominance.

Inserted into this story, in alternating chapters, the narrator includes a series of whimsical "digressions" on various subjects. William Wotton responded to Temple with Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning , showing that the Epistles were a later forgery. A response by the supporters of the Ancients was then made by Charles Boyle later the 4th Earl of Orrery and father of Swift's first biographer. A further retort on the Modern side came from Richard Bentley , one of the pre-eminent scholars of the day, in his essay Dissertation upon the Epistles of Phalaris The final words on the topic belong to Swift in his Battle of the Books , published in which he makes a humorous defence on behalf of Temple and the cause of the Ancients.

In , a cobbler named John Partridge published a popular almanac of astrological predictions. Because Partridge falsely determined the deaths of several church officials, Swift attacked Partridge in Predictions for the Ensuing Year by Isaac Bickerstaff , a parody predicting that Partridge would die on 29 March. Swift followed up with a pamphlet issued on 30 March claiming that Partridge had in fact died, which was widely believed despite Partridge's statements to the contrary.

According to other sources, [ citation needed ] Richard Steele used the persona of Isaac Bickerstaff, and was the one who wrote about the "death" of John Partridge and published it in The Spectator , not Jonathan Swift. The Drapier's Letters was a series of pamphlets against the monopoly granted by the English government to William Wood to mint copper coinage for Ireland. It was widely believed that Wood would need to flood Ireland with debased coinage in order to make a profit. In these "letters" Swift posed as a shop-keeperβ€”a draperβ€”to criticise the plan. Swift's writing was so effective in undermining opinion in the project that a reward was offered by the government to anyone disclosing the true identity of the author.

Though hardly a secret on returning to Dublin after one of his trips to England, Swift was greeted with a banner, "Welcome Home, Drapier" no one turned Swift in, although there was an unsuccessful attempt to prosecute the publisher John Harding. Swift" Swift recalled this as one of his best achievements. It is regarded as his masterpiece. As with his other writings, the Travels was published under a pseudonym, the fictional Lemuel Gulliver, a ship's surgeon and later a sea captain. Some of the correspondence between printer Benj. Motte and Gulliver's also-fictional cousin negotiating the book's publication has survived. Though it has often been mistakenly thought of and published in bowdlerised form as a children's book, it is a great and sophisticated satire of human nature based on Swift's experience of his times.

Gulliver's Travels is an anatomy of human nature, a sardonic looking-glass, often criticised for its apparent misanthropy. It asks its readers to refute it, to deny that it has adequately characterised human nature and society. Each of the four booksβ€”recounting four voyages to mostly fictional exotic landsβ€”has a different theme, but all are attempts to deflate human pride. Critics hail the work as a satiric reflection on the shortcomings of Enlightenment thought.

Therefore let no man talk to me of other expedients Therefore I repeat, let no man talk to me of these and the like expedients, till he hath at least some glympse of hope, that there will ever be some hearty and sincere attempt to put them into practice. John Ruskin named him as one of the three people in history who were the most influential for him. George Orwell named him as one of the writers he most admired, despite disagreeing with him on almost every moral and political issue. Swift crater , a crater on Mars 's moon Deimos , is named after Jonathan Swift, who predicted the existence of the moons of Mars.

In honour of Swift's long-time residence in Trim , there are several monuments in the town marking his legacy. Most notable is Swift's Street, named after him. Trim also holds a recurring festival in honour of Swift, called the 'Trim Swift Festival'. Jake Arnott features him in his novel The Fatal Tree. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Anglo-Irish satirist, essayist, and cleric β€” The Very Reverend.

Portrait by Charles Jervas , Satirist essayist political pamphleteer poet priest. This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. Poetry portal. In Lee, Sidney ed. Dictionary of National Biography. Jonathan Swift: The Reluctant Rebel. Jonathan Swift. ISBN Archived from the original on 26 January Retrieved 4 October Archived from the original on 2 July Retrieved 16 March Cambridge University Press. Retrieved 3 November The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Swift.

Victorian Web. Archived from the original on 8 November Retrieved 26 October Queen Anne. Yale University Press. Life of Jonathan Swift , vol. The Judges in Ireland , vol. Peter Lang GmbH. The Irish Times. Archived from the original on 9 January Retrieved 12 April A Modest Proposal. London: Penguin. Who's Who in Lesbian and Gay Writing. Archived from the original on 15 February Retrieved 19 May Performing Arts Review.

Chicago Reader. Archived from the original on 9 February Retrieved 9 February The Fatal Tree. Archived from the original on 2 December Retrieved 1 December Damrosch, Leo New Haven: Yale University Press. Includes almost illustrations. Delany, Patrick London: W. OL M. Fox, Christopher, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ehrenpreis, Irvin The Personality of Jonathan Swift. London: Methuen. I: Mr. Swift and his Contemporaries. II: Dr. III: Dean Swift. Nokes, David Oxford: Oxford University Press. Orrery, John Boyle, Earl of []. Remarks on the Life and Writings of Dr. Jonathan Swift third, corrected ed.

London: Printed for A. Stephen, Leslie English Men of Letters. OL W. Noted biographer succinctly critiques pp. In Smith, George ed. Archived from the original on 24 November Retrieved 31 December Wilde, W. Dublin: Hodges and Smith. From his Lives of the Poets. Patrick's, Dublin. Paris: A. Galignani, Whibley, Charles Jonathan Swift at Wikipedia's sister projects. Sermons of Jonathan Swift. Jonathan Swift 's Gulliver's Travels Lemuel Gulliver Glumdalclitch. The Engine Houyhnhnm Struldbrugg Yahoo. Cultural influence of Gulliver's Travels. Irish poetry. Marshall W. Faber Book of Irish Verse. The Wanderings of Oisin. The thing, of course, with this unmitigatedly good news story is that it has little to nothing to do with Brexit. Indeed, quite surprisingly, not even the Express tried to claim that it did.

In spite of all the distorting and twisting of reality, this week also brought further signs that reality starts sinking in even at the Express. Signs also continue appearing that the government is aware that Brexit is not going particularly well. I have already mentioned the extension of Operation Brock. The letter was sent to institutional investors around the country. The discontent with various aspects of Brexit now seems to be spreading among the British population. Another survey found that two thirds of the population are unhappy about the lack of transparency about the content of the new Free Trade Agreements the government has signed.

Still, so far impact of Brexit on the economy resembles a slow puncture rather than a radical decline as Chris Grey aptly put it. This allows Brexiteers to cast doubt on the causes of Brexit-inflicted damages to the UK economy and find alternative explanations for them. For instance, so far the government very skilfully uses the pandemic as scapegoat for what almost certainly are Brexit effects. The sovereignty discourse may run its course if reality starts hitting people where it hurts.

This could happen more quickly than some may expect if the Express and similar papers stop selling real existing Brexit to the people independently of its reality. But some politicians seem confident that the strategy of lying to the people can work indefinitely. Others of course disagree. People I know voted for Brexit and Johnson because he told them it would bring better jobs and more of them. And they believed him. Now I hear a lot of them say they feel duped. Brexit is an unnecessary self-inflicted wound. The question now is whether it will continue to fester or whether it can be healed.

Re-joining remains for now a very faint possibility indeed. So, Brexit is a fact we will have to learn to live with for now. So, the best we can hope for for now is a government that pursues a more cooperative and productive relationship with the EU. If that were to happen, perhaps Brexit could offer some real dividends? Anand Meno argued this week that Brexit and the pandemic may have one important positive effect, which is that they exposed the deep regional and other inequalities that divide this country. There is now an emerging consensus across party lines that these divides are indeed a problem that needs solving. That may sound like an evidence to many readers.

However, recently former Labour leader Ed Miliband pointed out on the Talking Politics podcast that back in , David Cameron would not have accepted this analysis of the situation. Brexit is a massive price to pay for that miscalculation and misreading of the situation in parts of the country β€” but now that it has happened, politicians from all parties need to draw the lessons and start seeking real solutions for the inequalities that afflict the country.

Brexit was marketed as a national rejuvenation, not something to be survived. Historical comparisons are always dangerous, but we should not forget that due to deep socio-economic divisions, a seemingly stable European continent descended into violence and chaos before. The Brexit vote was merely a symptom of a society riven by deep economic and cultural divides. Brexit will not solve any of the underlying problems that have torn these rifts open over the past forty years.

As Brexit is turning into the disaster many of us feared it would be, perhaps a space will open for a more reasonable debate about what really caused the ills that afflict the UK and divide its population. No doubt Brexit was an unnecessary and too high price to pay for the chance of focusing on solving the deep-seated problems the UK is facing. But if it ultimately allows us to stop the sky from falling in, at least something good will have come out of it.

The first one was a short blog entry reporting the findings of a new study on the impact of actual immigration levels on Euroscepticism in European countries. We know that anti-immigration sentiments have a strong impact on Euroscepticism and support for right-wing parties. The actual level of immigration is often misperceived by the population; and it is the perception not the actual level of immigration that drives Euroscepticism. This is remarkable in several respects.

The situation in Northern Ireland is probably the most politically salient Brexit issues of them all. That in itself is somewhat surprising. The high proportion of people blaming the EU for the issues is also remarkable because it seems evident that the UK government has repeatedly acted in violation of its own international commitments and has even openly admitted to being willing to break international law to get out of an agreement it signed less than two years ago.

The actions of the UK government are well documented including on this blog. To me, this indicates once again that we have left the realm of reason a long time ago and are knee-deep in a swamp of nationalist ideology and posturing. Both news pieces once again underscore the importance of discourse and propaganda in the political battles that have unfolded around Brexit. Eight months into real existing Brexit, it starts to become possible to evaluate whether sovereignty was indeed worth the high economic cost of Brexit. But what does the government actually mean by sovereignty? The dictionary definition of sovereignty β€” e.

Yet, as always with complex constitutional matters, the devil is in the detail. Brexiteers do not make these distinctions. The average Brexiteer seems to equate authority with the power to do whatever they want and using coercive force if need be. That hints at a very crude understanding of authority as coercive power. Authority, however, is fundamentally a constitutional concept that crucially hinges on the notion of legitimacy.

In a modern rule of law state, that legitimacy of power has to be grounded in the law. Needless to say, that Brexiteers do not see any need to be bound by law β€” be it national or international β€” as documented abundantly in relation to the referendum campaign , during the negotiations with the EU , and since. The version of sovereignty that Brexiteers seem to privilege, therefore is one where the sovereign is above the law. Just like authority does not mean unlimited, arbitrary power, supreme authority does not mean absolute authority.

Indeed, being the supreme authority in a given territory simply implies that there is no other legitimate instance above it. Absoluteness, on the other hand, does not recognise any such boundaries and makes a claim to authority over all matters within a given territory. Here too, it seems to me, that Johnson and other Brexiteers have a tendency to at least ignore that difference, but quite possibly to favour the latter conception over the self-limiting one. Finally, the modern conception of sovereignty is a territorial idea, in that it attributes supreme authority within the bounds of a given state.

This implies that sovereignty comes with a strong claim of non-interference by other sovereigns in internal matters. This new doctrine of humanitarian intervention is not uncontroversial and can be debated. Overall, then, Johnson and his fellow Brexiteers seem to have a very specific type of sovereignty in mind. This type of sovereignty does not recognise any limitations β€” legal or otherwise β€” to the exercise of state power. This absolutist, extra-legal conception of sovereignty is the one that Thomas Hobbes developed in the 17th century in his famous Leviathan in reaction to the unrest of the religious wars. This conception prevailed during the absolutist era of the 17th and 18th century, but was then replaced by a liberal one, where even the sovereign is subjected to the rule of law.

I think it could be worse than that. What they propose is more extreme than what even Hobbes had in mind. Advocating for an unbounded, extra-legal conception of sovereignty in a society that has also largely abolished self-restraint and moral constraints on individual freedom and selfishness would arguably have even more devastating consequences than 17th century absolutism. In fact, the last legal scholar of note who did advocate for an extra-legal concept of sovereignty that places the absolute sovereign above the law, was Carl Schmitt in the s.

Schmitt of course, then went on to become the leading legal and constitutional theorist of the Third Reich. The ideological attractiveness of a notion of extra-legal sovereignty to power-hungry people like Johnson is clear. Yet, the practical and economic usefulness of this type of sovereignty remains elusive. Since January , the government has charged a high-profile group of conservative politicians with trying to figure out what sort of regulatory reforms could be undertaken. Clearly, the report of that group does not amount to much. Hence the government has hired external consultants to identity possible Brexit benefits. This reveals a fundamental flaw in Brexiteer ideology. Regulations may be annoying, cumbersome, and are often certainly far from perfect.

But oftentimes they exist for very good reasons. For both these reasons, getting rid of them is often not a great idea. Sam Lowe and Derek Hill, brilliantly explain how the UK could use its regained regulatory sovereignty regarding medical devices, but also show in impressive fashion that doing so may have few benefits and come at considerable costs for British citizens and producers of medical devices. Another lesson from eight months of real existing Brexit is that exercising your regulatory sovereignty means that you are creating more red tape for businesses.

The UK government has decided to create a whole new bureaucracy to assess the conformity of goods with UK rules, while not actually proposing β€” for now β€” to diverge from EU rules. Most strikingly, this duplication of administrative procedures happens regardless of whether or not the UK actually deviates from EU standards regarding any given product. The conformity assessment case does forbade that the ideological nature of the Brexit project and the elusive real benefits of Brexit, may mean that by trying to reassert its sovereignty, the government will exercise its regulatory autonomy and diverge from EU rules simply for the sake of it rather than to achieve any specific benefit.

Perhaps, over time, as the unintended consequences of additional red tape created by sovereignty become undeniable so that even the government has to admit them , there will be room for a more rational approach. This could then open up a myriad of new opportunities to solve some of the many issues with the current post-Brexit arrangements; e. It has led people to claim Brexit is a project to take the country back to the s , or the 19th century.

My analysis of sovereignty would even suggest a return to 17th century absolutism. Of course, that is a crude and exaggerated way of putting it. Still, I do think the dangerous constitutional impact of redefining sovereignty in the way Brexiteers do, should not be underestimated β€” democracies can and do die. Worse still, Brexit Britain is not alone with its sovereignty project and indeed joins an increasingly powerful movement of more or less authoritarian states that seeks to reassert sovereignty at the expense of international cooperation and human rights. In the pursuit of his sovereignty project, Johnson may hence betray yet another key Brexit promise, namely, to give power back to the people.

It is to be hoped that the grip of ideology over reality can be loosened in time for us not to have to relive the painful history of fighting for democracy and human rights. Beyond Northern Ireland, the impact of Brexit on the UK labour market, investments and the public finances of the devolved authorities stick out as conspicuous issues. The gesture was particularly unexpected, because of reports the previous week that the EU was preparing to escalate the legal cases. The first interpretation β€” quite prominent in many online comments on the matter β€” is that the EU is attempting to show that it is the reasonable party.

That interpretation is probably too far-fetched, because the victimhood discourse is mainly targeted at the UK public and the EU does not have much to gain from undermining that discourse now that Brexit has happened. The second interpretation is that the EU is pursuing an appeasement strategy to create the best possible conditions for negotiating solutions to the issues arising from the NIP and its implementation as opposed to renegotiate the protocol. The third interpretation, is that the legal action simply will not achieve much. As I noted before, despite the fact that in all likelihood the UK is currently breeching the terms of the NIP, there is not that much the EU can do in the short run to stop the UK from doing so.

The legal process will take a long time during which the UK can continue to refuse carrying out the necessary border checks and controls. If the EU were to impose retaliatory tariffs without legal basis, that would send a strong signal, but would not solve the problem of UK goods that are not conform with EU regulations possibly entering the Single Market via NI. Dropping the β€” most likely not very effective β€” legal action for the time being does hence seem like a reasonable concession. The key question, however, is how will the UK government react to the announcement of a suspension of legal action? Frost and the UK government may very well interpret this decision as a sign of weakness and confirmation that their hardball strategy is working.

Given previous instances where any compromise from the EU side is used to make even more demands rather than compromise in return, suggests that this is what may happen this time too. Chris Grey noted this week that rather than a negotiation strategy aimed at getting the most from the EU without actually achieving the stated demands, Frost may actually believe that what he asks for in the command paper can be obtained.

Ultimately, the UK government will have to accept that an Irish Sea border is the price to pay for a hard Brexit. The solution to the issue is hence either more flexibility from the UK side e. It is unlikely that these solutions will be found under the current UK government composed of hard Brexiteers. What will happen next then is most likely a prolonged conflict over the NIP. He may even trigger Article 16, but that will not solve anything either. So, the most likely short-term fix is to extend the current situation β€” including grace periods β€” until there is movement on the UK side.

The domestic implications: Divisiveness as a political strategy. That may not be a bad outcome for Frost and Johnson. Grey suggests instead that Frost actually believes that his approach can be successful. Similarly, Prof. This suggests by implication that he does indeed not see any space for compromise and therefore puts forward his proposals in a genuine belief that they are the only possible solution. This interpretation implies that Lord Frost does not understand that the hardball strategy is bound to fail and that his asks will never be accepted by the EU.

So, I will trust the real experts here and assume that Lord Frost adopted this strategy in a genuine belief that he can succeed. Willingly or unwillingly, the Brexit government will therefore always be drawn towards confrontation and grandstanding rather than cooperation and compromise. Creating, reinforcing, exploiting division is the natural instinct of Johnson and his government. From that perspective, flouting the terms of the NIP, taking the flak from the EU for it, and shouting it from the roof tops, does seem like a possible strategy to maintain popular support for a government that β€” as not just the Guardian , but even Tories seem to accept β€” fundamentally does not care much about Northern Ireland.

Of course, there is a risk that the situation gets out of hand. For instance by reigniting sectarian violence in Northern Ireland. But this is a government that has come to power by playing with fire, or rather by actually starting a conflagration. There is little hope that it will stop short of making things worse, if it serves its political purposes. Seven months into Brexit, then, there is still a major festering wound poisoning the relationship with the EU and between communities in NI.

Yet, that is not the only area where Brexit is all but done. There is a lot of evidence that the UK government was simply utterly unprepared for the end of the transition period on January 1st, One important example is the replacement of EU funds for the devolved authorities. In the meantime, devolved authorities can bid for money from the Levelling Up and Community Renewal Funds. Yet β€” in another sign of re-concentration of power in Westminster after Brexit β€” these funds are not new money, are not guaranteed but subject to competitive bidding , and are administered by Westminster and not like EU funds directly by the devolved authorities.

Devolution may become another victim of Brexit and the Welsh another group betrayed by Brexit promises. Brexit also continues to have a major impact on many aspects of the UK economy. Unsurprisingly, the Express is jubilant about the state of the British economy. Top economist hails UK as Europe investment powerhouse. It is probably not the last time that I am commenting on an article in the Express or a similar pro-Brexit news outlet to try and rebut bold claims about the positive impact of Brexit on the economy that are based on wishful thinking rather than any rigorous interpretation of actual data.

Fortunately, this task will become easier with time, because with every passing day, we have got more data that will allow us to carry out methodologically solid and scientifically rigorous studies on the impact of Brexit on the UK economy. They find that deeper economic integration leads to more investment. This effect can be attributed to the single market with some certainty, because the study shows that the effect did not occur in the EU before when the single market was realised. Many of the factors attracting investors to the UK have not changed with Brexit. But one of the most important factors that made the UK a very attractive investment location β€” unhampered access to the EU Single Market β€” is now gone.

Which means however much FDI flows into the country post-Brexit it would probably have been a lot more without Brexit. Randolph Bruno and colleagues estimate the decline in FDI to be as much The Express suggests that Prof Portes had admitted that economists were wrong about the impact of EU membership on wages in Britain. Recent media reports about labour shortages and wage rises in the hospitality and retail sectors seem to suggest that β€” contrary to predictions β€” the impact of the end of free movement on wages was non-negligible.

Referring to these reports, prof. The Express of course only quotes the question, but not the answer that Prof. Portes gives in the column. This double shock has led to the fastest drop in staff availability on record in the UK, which is likely to have a short-term positive effect on wages in the worst affected sectors. However, in the long term, whether or not British workers in low-skilled jobs will significantly benefit from the end of freedom of movement will depend on many things.

Assuming that EU workers do indeed not return after the pandemic and that they are not being replaced by immigrant workers from non-EU countries, there could be a long-term reduction in labour supply while demand is likely to increase post-pandemic. Yet, more and better paid jobs for British workers who replace the abundant EU-workforce is only one possible result from this situation. The others are that employers could compensate for the reduction in the work force through increased productivity producing more with fewer workers , or a reduction in output and number of businesses. Portes suggests that the latter possibility is probably the most likely one.

Even if wages in some sectors with labour shortages increase, the increased wages may be passed onto consumers via increasing prices β€” thus reducing real wages of workers in other sectors who buy these products. The key point, however, is that this all remains speculation as we do not have enough data yet to know for sure. What all these problems mentioned in this blog post β€” Northern Ireland border issues, finances of the devolved governments, FDI, and wages β€” have in common is that these are, with the exception of wages perhaps, not pre-existing problems that were affect by Brexit.

Rather, these are all problems that we did not have before but were created by Brexit! Worse still, things will probably have to get a lot worse before any change of direction can happen. Runciman pointed out that such a strategy would only become politically viable if the UK experienced a massive unemployment crisis so that the negative effect of Brexit became undeniable and unbearable for the majority of the population. While we are β€” fortunately β€” not there yet, there were some signs this week that in some areas Brexit has already gotten bad enough that the opposition starts building a political strategy on correcting it. While I wrote last week that Labour seem to have accepted Brexit and do not seem prepared to fight it anymore, this week shadow chancellor Rachel Reeves struck a somewhat different tone.

She also explicitly promised to address the hurdles preventing UK musicians and theatre companies from touring the EU freely. Yet, the sad fact remains that we now live in a country where the government has an interest in stoking division to maintain popular support, while the opposition may be hoping for Brexit to do maximal damage to make its emerging strategy viable. This week was another important one in the Brexit process. However β€” tellingly β€” with Lord Frost and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon Lewis presenting their proposals for changes to the Northern Ireland Protocol NIP in a command paper , the news agenda once again was dominated by the situation in Northern Ireland β€” relegating any other Brexit-related issues to the background.

What is going to happen next then? In the short run not much probably, because the EU parliament is now on summer recess. When it comes back, some observers believe there is some leeway for the EU to compromise on certain specific issues raised in the command paper and the EU may be ready to make some additional concessions to meet the UK half-way. Rather than a resolution of the problem, the most likely outcome is heightened tensions and unresolved problems in NI. Of course, for the UK government the reasons to refuse such a pragmatic solution are mainly ideological taking back control, sovereignty, and all that. Moreover, it is probably not mentioned often enough that the UK has a chequered record in terms of SPS and food safety as illustrated by the Mad Cow disease that led to a temporary ban of British beef in Europe.

So, what is the point putting forward these proposals? Partly, the reason will be domestic and meant to support the narrative that the UK is being pragmatic, suggesting various possible solutions, while the EU is being stubborn, unreasonable, bureaucratic, and inflexible. This strategy is disingenuous not only because the government must know most proposals had been considered before and are unacceptable to the EU, but also because it denies the EU the right to protect its borders in anyway it sees fit β€” the very same right in the name of which we left the EU.

Brexiters being unable to accept that is another illustration of their bad faith. Or in other words, that having your cake and eating it is a fundamentally unrealistic expectation to have in life and especially in politics. Any element of cooperation is seen as a weakness. Another - more benign - explanation for the proposals may be that the UK Government may not take the consequences of not respecting the NIP seriously.

These legal measures will take a long time to reach a resolution, but the TCA also allows parties to introduce retaliatory tariffs in case the other party breaches the protocol. While subject to legal challenge as well, such tariff measures could presumably be introduced quickly and would potentially hurt all of UK business β€” not just those concerned with NI issues. They would almost certainly lead to the UK triggering Art.

Concretely that would then mean the UK simply ignores the protocol and lets British companies export to NI without border checks required by the EU. What could the EU do to prevent its Single Market from being breached in this way? Of course, introducing retaliatory tariffs on UK goods may put economic pressure on the UK government. But it would also be met by UK reactions β€” presumably imposing tariffs on EU goods in return β€” leading to economic damage being multiplied on both sides. Plus, the economic pressure would not solve the immediate issue of potentially sub-standard GB goods being traded inside the EU single market.

The only two options for the EU to prevent that from actually happening would be to impose its own border checks between NI and the Republic of Ireland β€” thus reneging on its own red line since the beginning of the Brexit process β€” or β€” even worse perhaps β€” to impose border checks between the Republic and the rest of the EU. Both are politically unacceptable solutions, which means β€” in the short term at least β€” the EU would have to accept the breach of the single market.

An additional complication here is that with the command paper, the UK government explicitly rejects the governance mechanisms it agreed to two years ago β€” namely by rejecting the legitimacy of EU Institutions and the European Court of Justice ECJ to adjudicate disputes under the protocol paragraph This may very well lead to a trade war in which the legal basis to settle it itself is disputed. This would come close to a situation of international anarchy where the parties will try and solve their problems purely based on power not in an ordered rule-based fashion. Once again Northern Ireland has hence dominated the news agenda.

The governments approach to NI makes sure the discussions focus not on reality, but takes place in the realm of wishful thinking. Yet, perhaps driven by my own wishful thinking, I noticed some evidence that reality may finally be sinking in among Brexiters. Indeed, directly, or indirectly, willingly or unwillingly β€” but always without taking responsibility β€” examples are mounting that Brexiters start acknowledging that so far Brexit has been a failure. Most importantly, Lord Frost now acknowledges that the NIP is unsustainable if the goal is to achieve a hard Brexit and taking the UK out of the EU single market while guaranteeing frictionless trade.

Further evidence that the Government now understands that its Brexit deal including the NIP was a failure comes from the fact that it now seeks to blame Parliament β€” in particular the Benn Act that made a no-deal outcome impossible β€” to explain why it accepted the terms of the NIP and TCA. Whatever the truth behind this strategy of apportioning blame, we are miles away from the Brexit government taking credit for dividends from a Brexit that was meant to be unmitigatedly good for the UK, the easiest trade deal in history , and oven-ready. That in itself is ample evidence of failure. The realisation that Brexit provides few dividends and a lot of costs starts creeping into the discourse of public officials too.

Even the Express cannot avoid reporting on the Brexit-induced shortages of lorry drivers, fruit and veg pickers, and other workers. Although, of course, they blame the EU for it. This distortion of evidence and truth by both the UK Government and the pro-Brexit right-wing press will continue for some time. But the increasingly obvious reality of the impact of Brexit on the UK economy will make it increasingly harder to weave the web of lies needed to maintain the illusion of a successful Brexit.

Yet, as the government is taking measures to address the problems of key workers who have to self-isolate, Brexit reality will become a bit clearer still and one day it will increasingly have to be accepted. Lisa Nandy is downplaying the divisions created by Brexit. That belief is most likely false. Yet, with Brexit reality biting, there may soon be an opportunity window for a bolder political strategy that does not engage with the Johnson government on its own terms, but that shapes the political agenda.

There are signs that the public may start supporting alternative relationships with the EU than the distant and fraught one the Johnson Government is proposing. Nandy seems to acknowledge that, but does not see re-joining as a possible alternative to the current state of affairs. Yet, based on the experience of non-member countries such as Switzerland and Norway, it is obvious that the EU does not currently have a model for stable cooperative relationships with neighbouring countries that offer the benefits of membership without its downsides. Small countries may be willing to pay a considerable economic prize to maintain a certain autonomy, as joining a club that is perceived to be dominated by large economies is a daunting prospect for a small country.

If labour were to come to power, seeking a closer relationship would sooner or later necessarily lead to a realisation of that fact and therefore bring the re-join question on the table again. The past few weeks were all about Football. However, in a sign of how toxic the atmosphere in Britain has become since the Brexit referendum, instead of celebrations for second place in a major tournament, what followed was vile racial slurs on social media against the three black players who missed their penalties and a fallout in the traditional media that reached the hights of British politics including the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary.

The Euro final seems to have been the match that set ablaze the powder keg we have been sitting on at least since the hateful Brexit referendum campaign. While hateful campaigns and politicians capitalising on hatred and divisive rhetoric is of course nothing new. More generally hatred and divisiveness was the fuel that propelled UKIP onto the British political scene in the s. However, the Brexit referendum campaign saw this style of divisive politics β€” previously mostly contained to the fringe of the political spectrum β€” gain a foothold in mainstream Toryism. Indeed, Brexit made it possible for an extreme right-wing faction of the Conservative party β€” around the so-called European Research Group ERG β€” to hijack the whole organisation and take control of the government when Boris Johnson was elected as party leader in July The post-Euro fall out has been in the making for several weeks.

While such statements and actions may have quickly been forgotten after the end of Euro , the vile parage of racist abuse against the three black players who missed their penalties on Sunday cast these statements into a different light altogether. With the benefit of hindsight, it now becomes clear that rather than supporting freedom of speech, what such statements by leading politicians does is not just tolerating but condoning and even encouraging racism.

Even Johnson and Patel seemed to realise that and issued statements now condemning the online abuse of the players. Johnson of course will not change his approach after this defeat. He is a master of mixed messaging β€” not just regarding racism, but also regarding the Covid19 pandemic. What is particular striking with the Euro fallout, is the strong contrast between the English national team and its supporters. The two seemed like polar ends on a spectrum of class and decency. Dignified and generous in victory and defeat. On the other hand, the fans. Sadly it is the latter images of the disgraceful England β€” rather than that of Southgate and his players β€” that went viral on social media, were picked up by foreign newspapers and magazines e.

Euro and Brexit - Games of two halves? It is tempting to draw a straight line between the Brexit vote and this Janus-faced nature of England as portrayed by its national team and its fans, as some twitter users have done e. There may be some truth in this idea, as excessive nationalism in football is likely to correlate with support for leaving the EU. Yet, there is a risk inherent in this bi-polar view of England as well. Indeed, there are good reasons to be critical of some aspects of the EU too , and those reasons may have motivated a considerable part of leave voters. As such, the view that Brexit was about the division of the country into two halves β€” as suggested by the result β€” is wrong and purely an artefact of the referendum itself. A question that only gives you two options would naturally split the country into two parts.

In the case of leave, it implies amplifying precisely the voices of that vocal nationalist β€” and arguably often racist β€” minority among the leaver voters, while silencing all others. Neither silent, nor a majority β€” The politics of a vocal minority. Yet, this whole discourse is most certainly false. However, even that idea of a particularly nationalist and conservative β€” let alone anti-woke β€” North of England, is probably false as Henry Mance has recently argued. The General Election illustrates this perfectly. That sounds like massive popular support for the government. As long as a small, but motivated and vocal minority can be mobilised in the right constituencies, an extreme political platform can be successful in gaining governmental power.

However, this week we seem to witness some realisation amongst more centrist Tories that catering to a small, extreme minority of the electorate may not be costless after all. This may slowly force the political agenda in the country back onto more substantive policy issues than the cultural war games that the Johnson Government likes to play. Other parties would do well to anticipate this change and focus on solving actual social and economic problems, rather than seeking to outcompete the Tories on the culture war terrain where they simply cannot win without betraying what they stand for see my earlier blog on this. One of the astonishing facts of Brexit Britain is the struggles the Labour party has had in finding any coherent and electorally appealing strategy to counter the Brexit governments strategy.

That is partly because many labour voters and politicians are themselves pro-Brexit, or at least anti-EU. Moreover, that majority seems to be overrepresented in the traditionally Labour heartlands in the North of England. However, that panic is largely unwarranted. Rather it is increasingly the party of the young, urban, professional voters β€” of which there are more and more. Trying to cling on to these red wall constituencies by defending policy positions that are contrary to its social-democratic values notably on immigration is a risky gamble.

The current Danish government let by the social-democratic PM Mette Frederiksen provides a striking example of that strategy. By competing with right-wing parties over immigration, Frederiksen campaigned on a strong anti-immigration stance during the elections. She won considerable support and managed to form a minority government. However, in the medium- to long-term this strategy almost certainly will alienate import parts of the traditionally social-democratic electorate.

This could be a particularly important question, given that that while Brexit voters were to be found amongst the older, male, less educated β€” as well as parts of a wealthy middle class who worry about the decline of the country rather than their own personal economic situation -, remain voters were younger, better educated, and also more female. So, what does an alternative winning electoral strategy look like? Three recent byelections may provide some real world clues. English pluralism: Three byelections β€” three Englands.

So far, there were three very different byelections in England in the Parliament , all of which took place in , i. It seems customary amongst scholars of British politics to preface any analysis of byelections by saying that they are a weak indicator of GEs. Yet, byelections are useful to zoom in and understand the complexity of the British electoral landscape. What do the three results tell us? A first interesting point to note is the indirect link to Brexit: Hartlepool voted While analysists underscore the importance of local factors in explaining the results e. Voters in Hartlepool are still hopeful that Brexit will deliver on its promises for them. Indeed, for now, Brexit is a promise not yet broken.

Here, the same electoral strategy that was victorious in the EU referendum also works at the local level. This was also a pro-Brexit constituency, although not has strongly as Hartlepool, but did not turn blue. The key explanation may be that Labour managed to successfully imitate a Johnson-style divisive electoral strategy. Batley and Spen therefore seems like a case where labour managed to beat the conservatives at their own game of division. Yet, just how successful this strategy was is another question. Indeed, despite the defeat, the conservatives actually saw their vote share increase by 3. The Labour victory may hence purely be down to luck and specific local circumstances.

It is questionable whether Labour can hold on to other red wall constituencies in the North of England using a similar divisive strategy. The result shows that what works in the North of England may not work in the home counties and possibly other areas of the country. What this suggests is that there may be a window of opportunity opening up as the Johnson government starts running out of steam.

Recent YouGov polls show that the honeymoon period for Johnson may be over with both Brexit dividends remaining elusive and the mishandling of the Covid19 pandemic once again becoming more evident as we are facing a fourth wave of infections despite the successful vaccination roll out. Labour may miss out on filling this gap if it persists with its single-minded focus on maintain or winning back the red wall constituencies. Of course, that is not to say that addressing the very real and justified grievances of people in the North of England should be dropped. This suggests that another β€” more substantive β€” strategy is required to hold or regain Northern English post-industrial constituencies. Regardless, what Britain needs more than anything else is the insight that the country is not divided into two halves.

Any electoral strategy should reflect that diversity in order to avoid further political marginalisation and feelings of disenfranchisement. Unfortunately, the first-past-the-post electoral system makes it all but impossible to see a party system emerge that reflects that diversity. England may well remain stuck in its bi-polar political disorder for some time to come. This has been a momentous week in the still ongoing Brexit process. July 1st was also going to be the expiration date for the grace periods on the export of chilled meats from Great Britain to NI. Fortunately, an extension of this grace period has now been mutually agreed.

There was also the usual stream of news about the economic impact of Brexit, which is turning out to be as bad as most economists had predicted. There is talk of threats of food shortages β€” among other things due to the lack of lorry drivers β€” and decline in trade with the EU. There were also some reports of positive impact of Brexit in the pro-Brexit papers though. The Telegraph celebrated the UK moving up in a ranking on the ease of doing business.

Two legal challenges - For and against Brexit. The ruling confirmed that the NIP did indeed conflict with the Act of Union, but at the same time ruled that, by voting in favour of the NIP, Parliament had β€” implicitly β€” repealed parts of the Act of Union. Another Brexit related legal challenge that was decided this week was the case brought by British Sugar plc. The High Court ruled that the company had the right to request a judicial review of that decision. The significance of this ruling is twofold: For one, it is a test for the aggressive - and some including myself would say reckless β€” international trade strategy that the Department for International Trade has adopted under the leadership of Liz Truss.

British Sugar, on the other hand refines home-grown beet sugar. The High Court did not rule on these claims, but found them plausible enough to allow a judicial review. The decision may lead to the courts setting important precedents around the governments post-Brexit trade and subsidy strategy. Beyond these events, two very significant developments in the areas of financial services regulation and state subsidies rules are to be reported. In financial services, another hugely important β€” albeit unsurprising β€” piece of Brexit news this week was the confirmation that it will be a no-deal Brexit in terms of financial services. This will likely spark more regulatory competition in financial services and a race to the bottom in terms of financial regulation.

Partly, this is already happening and having and impact. Indeed, another piece of Brexit news this week was that London reclaimed first place in equity trading in Europe, after having lost that spot to Amsterdam earlier in the year. This is to an important part due to the re-admission on the London Stock Exchange of Swiss stocks. Swiss stocks are banned from trading on EU stock exchanges after the EU Commission refused to extend its recognition of Swiss financial regulations as equivalent two years ago. Post-Brexit, the UK has benefitted from this situation by admitting Swiss stocks to the London Stock Exchange, which has helped boosting trading volumes.

The divergence from EU rules seems to pay dividends here. The new state subsidies rules β€” towards a new industrial policy? A somewhat less obviously momentous event was the introduction by the government of its plans for post-Brexit state subsidies rules in the form of the Subsidy Control Bill. This may sound like a boring technicality, but state aid was of course one of the main sticking points in the negotiations of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement TCA. Moreover, unlimited government guarantees and subsidies to insolent companies will be banned.

This means that the UK will continue to have some restrictions on subsidies and some oversight over their handing out. Something the EU will be happy with. However, the unit can only offer advice on whether a subsidy is fair , but cannot block any government subsidy. Any challenge will have to go through the judicial system and will be decided by the Competition Appeal Tribunal rather than the regulator. What was most interesting though, was that Business Secretary Kwasi Kwarteng was quick to reject the notion that this regime would amount to a " return to the failed s approach of government picking winners or bailing out unsustainable companies.

Another one is to call it an industrial policy. Yes, state subsides could β€” and often were β€” used to prop-up unviable companies e. But state subsidies can also form part of a coherent industrial policy. Yet, Kwasi Kwarteng has made it clear repeatedly that he did not wish the UK government to adopt an Industrial policy. Thus, earlier in the year, he shut down the Industrial Strategy Council against the will of industry. The question then is, in the absence of an industrial policy and hence a clear plan, how will the government use its newfound freedom to subsidies companies? More strategically, however, a lax state aid regime, unconstrained by any pre-defined policy plan, will also allow the government to strategically support companies in areas that may be electorally important.

The first thing is that it will hardly amount to a coherent strategy, but will rather be a set of haphazard and opportunistic actions that the government hopes will provide it with positive headlines in the red-top press to generate sufficient popular support to stay in power. Partly the absence of a coherent economic policy is due to a fundamental and unsolvable contradiction at the heart of the Brexit project: In terms of the international economy, the Brexit project is drawn between a nationalist, protectionist project and a globalist, free trade agenda.

Domestically, it contains a similar unsolvable contradiction between a libertarian, deregulatory agenda β€” in terms of financial services, genetically modified organisms GMOs , sanitary and phytosanitary standards for instance β€” and a much more interventionist economic policy based on increased state intervention in various areas e. It is less clear what the impact of such an incoherent economic policy will be on the UK economy. However, what the concept of institutional complementarities does point towards is the necessary interdependence of different spheres of a national business system such as the labour market and the financial system and the need for some sort of positive relationship between these different spheres.

This week was an interesting one Brexitwise. There was of course the fifth anniversary of the referendum. And one increasingly gets the feeling that slowly but surely Brexiteers are running out of excused and explanations for the elusive benefits of Brexit. Confirming thus indirectly, the thesis that Brexiteers never expected Brexit to mean Brexit. The interesting bit is not the attack on Breton, but the fact that the Express could not come up with a single element of evidence to counter the argument that the attempt to take back control had failed, and the UK stood increasingly isolated on the global scene.

But there was also an interesting stream of news about the UK governments increasing jingoism. In a move worthy of the worst dictatorship, the government endorsed a campaign that would have school children sing patriotic songs. The Russian reaction was to deploy fighter jets and allegedly fire warning shots at the British vessel although the Ministry of Defence immediately denied that account. Indeed, whenever Western countries engage with Putin on his β€” antagonistic and nationalistic β€” terms, it tends to strengthen his resolve and his backing in the Russian population.

But it would seem that we will have to get used to precisely such antagonistic and nationalist international diplomacy from the UK government too. It might be a stretch to suggest a direct link here, but it is interesting that while the failure of Brexit is already becoming increasingly clear for everyone to see β€” to the extent that Lord Frost is forced into micro-admissions of guilty at increasing frequency β€” , the nationalistic grandstanding of the Johnson Government also seems to strengthen. This starts taking on genuinely worrying proportions now. Beyond the realm of symbolic politics, the NIP and the economic consequences of Brexit figured prominently this week. In terms of the Northern Ireland Protocol, other than the fallout of Edwin Poots downfall as DUP leader after just 3 weeks, the big news was that the EU is expected to grant the UK a three-months extension on the grace periods on chilled meat exports from Great Britain to Northern Ireland.

Thus, averting an imminent clash at the end of the month. However, it also shows the difficult position that the EU finds itself in. Without the extension the most likely outcome would have been the UK government once again extending graces periods unilaterally and thus forcing the EU to react. The options the EU Commission would have had would essentially have been three: 1. Taking legal action once again, but accepting in the meantime the de iure violation of its internal market 2. Imposing its own border checks between NI and the Republic 3. Imposing its own border checks between Ireland and the rest of the EU.

All of these options would have been greatly problematic for the EU. The first one would have been interpreted as a sign of weakness or powerlessness and would have constitute a massive short-term victory for the UK government.

Analysis Of Jonathan Swifts A Modest Proposal shift by the opposition dh lawrence piano either trying to avoid taking a stance Natural Gas Fracking: Hydraulic Fracturing Brexit or trying to out-do the Tories on populist and nationalist rhetoric thunder road song symbolism, could be a major shift. In the case of trade, the Brexit choice is not and never was about free trade or no free trade. Runciman pointed out that such a strategy would only To Kill A Mockingbird Social Class Essay politically viable if the UK experienced a massive Analysis Of Jonathan Swifts A Modest Proposal crisis so Natural Gas Fracking: Hydraulic Fracturing the negative The Struggle In William Carlos Williams The Use Of Force of Brexit thunder road song undeniable and unbearable for the majority of the population. It is probably not the thunder road song time that I am thunder road song on an article Descriptive Writing About Snow the Aphrodite greek god or a similar pro-Brexit news outlet to try and rebut bold claims about the positive impact of Brexit on the economy that are based on wishful Theme Of Sleep And Death In The Epic Of Gilgamesh rather than any rigorous interpretation of actual data.